Some Darfuri politicians may have thought the moment was right to present similar claims, as the negotiations might be a sign the regime had been weakened. To counter them, the government decided to recruit militias from among the Arab groups, relying on a strategy the regime - but also the preceding ones, including during the democratic interlude - had already used in the south Flint and de Waal This had the advantage of allowing the regime to argue on the international stage that it was clearly not fighting a war in Darfur.
In order to lead this war on its behalf, the government identified key personalities, of whom the main — and most infamous — one was Musa Hilal. The sheikh of the nomadic Arab Mahameed group, Hilal established his headquarters in the area of Misteriha in North Darfur in the mids, leaving Aamo, the town where his father had established himself in and used to hold court.
He had already been involved in the fighting before the conflict broke out, and had ties with the then-Governor of North Darfur, General Abdallah Safi el Nur. The next Governor, Lieutenant-General Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan, apparently found Hilal too troublesome, and concerned about the increasing tensions in Darfur, he detained him and sent him to prison in Port Sudan, on the other side of the country. The Sheikh settled in the Kebkabiya area, where he organized meetings during which he ordered his fellow tribesmen to attack non-Arab villages HRWA Although exactly what was promised to the fighters cannot be known with certainty, the fighting offered them the opportunity to make what they were trying to take since the s theirs: land.
This pressing issue had been the reason behind attacks from one group or another in many parts of Darfur since the s, following waves of migration from the northern areas, which were affected by drought, and from neighbouring Chad that increased the pressure on available farmland Abdul-Jalil and Unruh — The issue was exacerbated by various land reforms, such as the Unregistered Land Act, which stated that all land that was not registered at that date belonged to the government, and the abolition of the custom-based Native Administration in These reforms allowed the newcomers to claim land rights, disregarding the customary rules that had previously regulated the allocation of land among groups Abdu-Jalil and Unruh It is important to mention, however, that not all groups contributed to the Janjaweed, and that many people opposed this strategy.
In any event, from then on, the Janjaweed began to act in coordination with government forces, which provided weapons and logistical support. Antonov aircraft, helicopters and Sudanese military vehicles were regularly spotted alongside the camel-riding Janjaweed HRWA Both sides have denied any such coordination.
The government, on the other hand, denied its involvement with the Janjaweeed de Waal Despite these claims, the relationship between the regime and Hilal was obvious, and his frequent round-trips to Khartoum left few doubts. According to Tubiana, the relationship between the Janjaweed and the central government involved three levels of authority:.
He is currently the subject of a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court — as is Bashir — for his involvement in the war. This process of creating militias can be interpreted as part of a counterbalancing strategy. The early years of the regime also saw the rising importance of the security services. While it is very difficult to find reliable information about the inner workings of the regime, even more so in the case of the security apparatus, it is said that the NISS is not only completely independent from the armed forces but also the one organization that is truly the strong arm of the regime interview, professor, Khartoum, March 25 Into add to these internal divisions, Bashir announced the creation of a small force called the Strategic Unit, which was to be in charge of crushing any revolt against the regime International Crisis Group One actually has only to wander around Khartoum a little to see this fragmentation incarnated in the many different uniforms that can be spotted along the streets.
But this collapse, which might come, as a consequence of their fragmentation or conflicts, is itself being used to intimidate the Sudanese or the international community. If we are to fight each other, this would bring hell to Sudan. The army in particular is looked upon suspiciously, as it is the actor that has the means to implement a coup. One of the most common practices used is counterbalancing, which consists in dividing the army into different organizations, for instance by creating paramilitary forces Belkin and Schofer ; Lee ; Powell These groups will then compete with each other, for funding, for example.
The creation of the PDF, the reinforcement of the NISS, and the subsequent creation of different bodies all contribute towards curtailing the power of the army, while at the same time making sure that no organization becomes completely overbearing.
At the same time, given the near impossibility of knowing what happens within these organizations, it may very well be true that the NISS is not as omnipotent as it is thought to be. According to one interviewee, it is the NISS that orchestrated the repression of the demonstrations that took place in September in many large cities, with the Janjaweed executing the orders interview, rebel leader, Khartoum, April 29 The Janjaweed have actually been brought in from Darfur to be stationed on the outskirts of Khartoum.
While some claim that they are only there for training purposes interview, retired army officer, April 28others argue they are there to stay, a claim that seems to be corroborated by recent events. This situation has fuelled tensions in these neighbourhoods, with reports of clashes between the local population and the repackaged Janjaweed Sudan Tribun e ; Sudan Tribun e This indeed raises the question of the control of the NISS over the Janjaweed, which seems more and more in doubt.
According to a Professor at the University of Khartoum, one of the devices the regime is using to ensure its survival is intimidation, which for the government means showing the Sudanese that if the regime falls, the situation is going to become even worse, a threat that is especially effective with the rise of ISIS in neighbouring countries. The deployment of the Janjaweed serves a specific purpose here: it sends a message that if people try to oppose the regime in ways that are considered to be too overt, they will pretty much let the dogs outand if they are toppled, these people will have no one to control them and all hell will break loose.
On the second day, even some police and military began to send cordial messages to the people on the streets. But on the third day, as the President himself put it in the TV, they have recourse to what they called…They said for the first day we allowed the people to express their…and the second day we saw that they began to destroy public and private properties.
And that is why, on the third day we switch to…the Janjaweed, with their land cruisers, with these … and with guns and they… people died. Students, workers and the like. And that is how they put…and this was a very strong message.
We are going to kill as much as possible if you continue to be on the streets. They are using this device very effectively and a lot of people on the street, ordinary people, they do believe that this government is bloody and they can kill.
One has to balance factions to give them power with one hand, while making sure with the other that they do not start to feel too emboldened, to the point of fomenting a coup. This seems to be the case with Musa Hilal, who began his transformation from local leader to a politician of national stature at the end of the last decade.
Inhe was nominated as a special advisor to the President. He simultaneously made a decisive move to take control of gold mining in the Jebel Amer area of North Darfur. In fact, he had actually created a management board for the mine. On this occasion, Hilal reportedly called on the Sudanese to fight the regime Tubiana ; Radio Dabanga b. He then instructed his followers to boycott and obstruct the election in Darfur Sudan Democracy First In February, however, the government apparently accepted his demands and signed a memorandum of understanding with the SARC.
This undoubtedly ties in with the idea that factions within the regime are not much more than power devices created for the purpose of cutting a larger slice of the national cake. In the end, no faction is interested in overthrowing the system, because each benefits from the marginalizing power structure that forms the cornerstone of the regime.
It should not be forgotten, however, that this structure did not emerged suddenly in it is firmly rooted in decades of self-serving, inequality-producing politics that go back to the colonial era see, for instance, Ahmed ; Deng ; Vezzadini The fact that war may become politics as usual may nonetheless have unexpected consequences, as people who have committed terrible abuses are never held responsible, and are even rewarded.
This is very clear not only when one looks at the Janjaweed, but also when one studies the rebels. Through the power-sharing devices that are a part of every peace agreement nowadays, some rebels have gained access to prominent positions within the government.
Furthermore, peace agreements are negotiated and signed one after the other, with the latest one integrating the groups that spoiled the previous one. Hence, at the local level, more and more groups and sub-groups have started to acquire weapons for themselves, having noted how power-sharing seems to work in Sudan Bashir Ali Adi This process actually explains to a large extent not only why fighting is still under way in Darfur, but also why this situation does not threaten the government, since groups begin to fight each other for a share of power that in the end is always allocated by the government.
Here, instability does not preclude authoritarian resilience: it fuels it. Abdelwahid, M. Abdul-Jalil, M. Ahmed, E. Otayek and B. Ali, H. July Baas, S. Bashir, A. Behrends, S. Park, and R.
Belkin, A. Burr, M. African History. Markus Wiener. Cai, Y. De Juan, A. De Mesquita, B. Deng, F. Dobry, M. Favre, O. Fillieule and F.
El-Battahani, A. Hassan and C. Ray, Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan. Flint, J. Geddes, B. Gerschewski, J. Hassan, S. Africa Briefing. Kalyvas, S.
Kumar, A. Lee, T. Mamdani, M. Marchal, R. Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. N'importe quel dirigeant autoritaire est en mesure d'imposer des décisions. The authoritarian regime in the United States right now will pass. L' autoritarisme qui caractérise les États-Unis à l'heure actuelle ne durera pas toujours.
Botox paris izle net
This conclusion seems altogether possible considering that China is governed by an authoritarian regime scarcely tolerant of political dissent. Cette conclusion semble tout à fait possible compte tenu du fait que la Chine est dirigée par un régime totalitairequi ne tolère guère la dissidence politique. State Capitalism could be democratic or authoritarian. Le capitalisme d'état pouvait être démocratique ou autoritaire. Fascism is an authoritarian political ideology.
Le fascisme est une politique d'idéologie autoritaire. Rejoignez Reverso. Inscription Connexion Login.